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REFLECTIONS ON "CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY
STANDARDS": THE PERPETUATION OF
AN IRRELEVANT CONCEPT IN THE
LAW OF OBSCENITY
FREDERICK F. SCHAUERt
Several recent obscenity prosecutions involving multi-state shipment
by national distributors of sexually explicit magazines and motion pictures
1
have brought heightened attention to the "contemporary community stan-
dards" aspect of Miller v. California.2 Miller rejected the concept of
national community standards in favor of the more localized determination
of the relevant community. This rejection resulted in a large amount of
commentary and controversy about, and popular and judicial misconception
of, the concept of local community standards.' The debate over whether
national or local standards should be employed continues undiminished.
t Visiting Scholar, Member of the Faculty of Law and Senior Member of Wolfson
College, Cambridge University; Associate Professor of Law (on leave), West Virginia Univer-
sity College of Law; A.B., 1967, M.B.A., 1968, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1972, Harvard Law
School.
1. None of these cases has generated a reported opinion. For factual accounts and
commentary, see, e.g., A Bad Case Makes Worse Law, 109 TIME, Feb. 21, 1977, at 51; A Dirty
Book Goes to Jail, 89 NEWSWEEK, Feb. 21, 1977, at 34; First Amendment Hustle; Trial of
Hustler Magazine Publishers, 224 NATION, Jan. 29, 1977, at 99; Kretchmer, Justice for 'Hust-
ler,' 89 NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 1977, at 13; Lapham, Confusion Worse Confounded, 254 HAR-
PERS, Apr. 1977, at 12; Marro, Prurient Interest in Memphis, 174 NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 24, 1976,
at 6; Morgan, United States versus the Princes of Porn, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1977, § 6, pt. 1
(Magazine), at 16; Neville, Has the First Amendment Met its Match?, id. at 18; Rembar,
Obscenity-Forget It, 239 ATLANTIC, May 1977, at 37.
2. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). This article does not attempt to deal with all of the issues raised by
the Miller opinion. For more comprehensive treatments, see, e.g., F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF
OBSCENrrY 44-48, 96-113, 116-35, 139-53, 164-68, 192-200 (1976); Gellhorn, Dirty Books, Dis-
gusting Pictures, and Dreadful Laws, 8 GA. L. REV. 291 (1974); Hunsaker, The 1973 Obscenity-
Pornography Decisions: Analysis, Impact, and Legislative Alternatives, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
906 (1974); Lockhart, Escape from the Chill of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex and the First Amend-
ment, 9 GA. L. REV. 533 (1975); Loewy, Abortive Reasons and Obscene Standards: A Comment
on the Abortion and Obscenity Cases, 52 N.C.L. REV. 223, 234-41 (1973); The Supreme Court,
1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1, 160-75 (1973); Comment, In Quest of a "Decent Society":
Obscenity and the Burger Court, 49 WASH. L. REV. 89 (1973); Recent Decisions, Constitutional
Law-Obscenity, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 442 (1973); Note, Obscenity '73: Something Old, A
Little Bit New, Quite a Bit Borrowed, But Nothing Blue, 33 MD. L. REV. 421 (1973); Note,
Miller v. California: A Cold Shower for the First Amendment, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 568 (1974);
Recent Developments, Constitutional Law-Obscenity-United States Supreme Court Adopts
a New Test, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 297 (1973).
3. On the community standards aspect of Miller, see F. SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 116-
35; Edelstein & Mott, Collateral Problems in Obscenity Regulation: A Uniform Approach to
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Implicit in these continuing controversies is the belief that the basic
notion of "contemporary community standards" is a viable component of
the test for obscenity. This acquiescence in the relevance of "contemporary
community standards" is by no means surprising. Few would deny that
obscenity judgments are both variable and more subjective than are judg-
ments applying most other legal concepts. 4 Thus, it appears natural to
incorporate recognition of this variability into a test for obscenity.
But the subjectivity and variability of determinations of obscenity do
not require the inclusion of the concept of contemporary community stan-
dards as part of a constitutional obscenity test. Deeper analysis shows that
the "contemporary community standards" component of the constitutional
test does not flow from the recognition that other eras and other cultures
would suppress as obscene that which our culture now believes to be clearly
within the protection of the first amendment. And although determinations
of obscenity should not vary according to the personal tastes or whims of
individual jurors (or judges), 5 the need for some general standard is no more
persuasive as an argument for the use of contemporary community stan-
dards. It is entirely possible to prevent subjective and repressive obscenity
judgments without encumbering the constitutional test with a factor that is
both conceptually unsound and practically unworkable.
This article will argue that the concept of contemporary community
standards appears in the Miller test for obscenity as a result of flawed
analysis of the earlier cases and a misunderstanding of the original purpose
of the community standards idea. The concept not only lacks historical and
precedential justification, but it also fails to relate to the theoretical founda-
tions of the Supreme Court's current definitional approach to obscenity.
Finally, the concept serves no independent purpose in the application of the
Miller test, merely duplicating other factors while making the Miller test
Prior Restraints, Conimunity Standards, and Judgment Preclusion, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 543
(1976); Schauer, Obscenity and the Conflict of Laws, 77 W. VA. L. REv. 377 (1975); Shugrue,
An Atlas for Obscenity: Exploring Community Standards, 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 157 (1974);
Comment, Pornography, The Local Option, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 97 (1974); Comment, Obsceni-
ty: Determined By Whose Standards?, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 324 (1974). See also Note, Communi-
ty Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller v. California, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1838
(1975).
4. Hence the Supreme Court's particular concern with vagueness in the area of obsceni-
ty. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 24, 27-28. See generally F. SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 154-
68. There is, however, some recent indication that the Court's concern for precisely drawn
statutes is waning. See Ward v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2085 (1977).
5. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 172 n.3 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 184
(S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
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substantially more confused. The result is an anachronistic and useless
element in modern obscenity law serving only to bewilder and not to clarify.
I. AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE CONCEPTION AND PERPETUATION OF
"CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY STANDARDS"
This article will accept, for analytical purposes, the doctrine that
obscenity is a class of utterance that is not speech and thus is not entitled to
first amendment protection.6 This doctrine is labelled the definitional theory
of obscenity. While persuasive arguments have attacked the conceptual
justification for this method of dealing with obscenity, 7 the theory behind
6. The Court first explicitly treated certain utterances as non-speech in Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("fighting words"), and thereafter applied the
concept in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (commercial speech), Beauharnais
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (libel), and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)
(obscenity). The exceptions for libel and commercial speech have since been undercut by New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel), and Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech). The
exception for fighting words has been vitiated by recent cases that have narrowed the definition
so as to allow their regulation even if they are classed as speech. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U.S. 518 (1972). Thus, obscenity remains the last bastion of a strict definitional approach to
first amendment protection.
7. The most significant analysis of the definitional approach and the one in which the
phrase "two-level theory" of speech was introduced is Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of
Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 1. The late Professor Kalven has been credited with having
"destroyed the intellectual foundations of the two-level theory." Karst, Equality as a Central
Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20, 30 (1975).
Kalven's masterful piece can, however, be read somewhat differently. It is important to
bear in mind that it was written in 1960. Professor Kalven was most concerned that the two-
level theory might be a vehicle for the suppression of serious literature, Kalven, supra at 12,
and suggested that a limitation to hard-core pornography would be the only application of the
two-level theory that could save it. Id. at 13. This has, of course, happened. Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. at 29. Professor Kalven was also concerned that the two-level theory might
be used as a general vehicle for first amendment adjudication. Kalven, supra at 17. This has not
happened; if anything, the trend is in the opposite direction. See note 6 supra. There may very
well be a principled distinction between obscenity methodology and all other areas of first
amendment analysis, however.
More basically, Professor Kalven's analysis assumes that obscenity is in fact speech,
Kalven, supra at 3-4, which is assuming away the issue. While the two-level theory of speech is
conceptually weak, a two-level theory of utterances, only one level of which is speech, is
discussed by the Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942), and Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-85 (1957). Of course there can be no federal judicial
deference to a state definition of non-speech; the determination of whether an utterance is
speech or non-speech is a constitutional question.
The real issue is whether all words are in fact speech. A reason all words should fall into
this category is the key to an attack on the two-level theory, but this reason is not to be found in
Professor Kalven's article or elsewhere. The Court's theoretical foundation-that some word
use is not speech--does not seem completely frivolous. See Finnis, "Reason and Passion":
The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 222 (1967).
There is, after all, "nothing intrinsically sacred about wagging the tongue or wielding a pen."
Henkin, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARv. L. REv. 63, 79 (1968).
The definitional approach to obscenity may be intellectually justifiable, but such an
analysis is beyond the scope of this article. It can also be defended on strictly pragmatic
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the Supreme Court opinion in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton8 once again
demonstrates that this approach continues to justify criminal prosecutions
for dealing in obscene materials. A properly precise analysis of the contem-
porary community standards concept must then assume this definitional, or
"two-level," theory of constitutional protection in which the use of "con-
temporary community standards" finds expression.
If, following the theory, one acknowledges that obscene utterances are
outside the scope of the first amendment, it becomes necessary to have a
carefully drawn definition of obscenity. Non-obscene utterances are speech
and generally remain protected by the Constitution. 9 The determination of
whether material is obscene, therefore, will be dispositive of the issue of
regulation. The definition of obscenity thus becomes a question of constitu-
tional law. To say otherwise would render the notion of first amendment
protection a nullity.10
Further, the purpose of the definition of obscenity can now be seen
most clearly-it performs the essential separating function of allocating one
type of utterance (the obscene) to relatively free legislative control and
another (speech) to constitutional protection from control. It is this need to
separate speech from non-speech that entitles and requires the Supreme
Court to define obscenity. While this definitional process may take place
conceptually, pragmatically or somewhere in between, the purpose will
remain the same. Thus, there is no need to evaluate whether the present
obscenity test is a correct exercise in first amendment analysis. Any
grounds, however. See Schauer, The Return of Variable Obscenity?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1275
(1977).
8. 413 U.S. 49 (1973). Paris dramatically points up the effects of the definitional ap-
proach by discussing at length the types of justifications for regulation that are sufficient if that
which is being regulated is not speech. Id. at 60-64.
9. Some strong justifications will support the regulation of speech, but the determination
of the necessary level of justification is an issue that embraces the entire range of first
amendment theory. One of the best contemporary analyses is Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1482 (1975).
10. On the definitional approach to the first amendment, see generally T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); Black, Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court and
the Bill of Rights, 222 HARPERS, Feb. 1961, at 63, reprinted in C. BLACK, THE OCCASIONS OF
JusrnCE 89 (1963); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 915-18 (1963); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962);
Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and
Misapplied to Prvacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968); Kauper, Book Review, 58 MICH. L. REV.
619 (1960) (reviewing A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960)).
Of course it is clear that there is some balancing of interests in the definitional process.
That does not mean, however, that this balancing may not be more or less particularistic. See
Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's Balancing Test, 76
HARV. L. REV. 755 (1963). The real objection to the Supreme Court's treatment of obscenity
may not be that it is a definitional approach, but that it is an overly conceptualistic definitional
approach, focusing only on the abstract meaning of the word "speech."
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categorization involves a definition, and any definition thus used must
inevitably perform this separating function. 1
That the purpose of the constitutional obscenity test was primarily to
separate protected from unprotected utterances was apparent in Roth v.
United States 2 and remains equally apparent today. The Roth majority
used the following language:
The door barring federal and state intrusions into [the area of
speech] cannot be left ajar; it must be kept' tightly closed and
opened only the slightest crack necessary to prevent encroachment
upon more important interests. It is therefore vital that the stan-
dards for judging obscenity safeguard the protection of freedom of
speech and press for material which does not treat sex in a manner
appealing to prurient interest.
13
This is not appreciably different in focus from the language used
sixteen years later in Miller: "But today, for the first time since Roth was
decided in 1957, a majority of this Court has agreed on concrete guidelines
to isolate 'hard core' pornography from expression protected by the First
Amendment." ' 14 Therefore, it is appropriate to evaluate the concept of
contemporary community standards by focusing on the separating function
that provides the raison d'9tre of a constitutional definition of obscenity.
Roth marked the Supreme Court's first major encounter with the
definition of obscenity and thus with the idea of contemporary community
standards. It is therefore instructive to look first at the use of the contempor-
ary community standards concept in Roth itself. In that case, the Court
defined obscenity while rejecting the English definition established in Regi-
na v. Hicklin.15 "Some American courts adopted [the Hicklin] standard but
later decisions have rejected it and substituted this test: whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."
16
The Court did not purport to create a new test for obscenity, but rather
to restate the definition prevailing in the state and federal courts of the
United States. A reading of the cases cited by the Court shows that it went
11. See notes 9 & 10 supra.
12. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
13. Id. at 488.
14. 413 U.S. at 29.
15. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). "IT]he test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the
matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall." Id. at 371. The
law of obscenity in England is still based on the "deprave and corrupt" formula. See generally
Davidow & O'Boyle, Obscenity Laws in England and the United States: A Comparative
Analysis, 56 NEB. L. REv. 249 (1977).
16. 354 U.S. at 489 (footnotes omitted).
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beyond mere transcription of the existing law.17 The test stated by Mr.
Justice Brennan for the Roth majority cannot be found in any of the cited
lower court opinions. Instead, it seems to have been gleaned from incom-
plete and often inconsistent principles contained in those cases.18 The
greater significance of the reference to the earlier cases is its indication that
it is in those cases, if anywhere, that one will find the origin of the
community standards concept. In fact, each of the cited cases that discusses
the notion of community norms 19 (the actual words "contemporary commu-
nity standards" appear to have been first used by the Roth court20), directly
or indirectly relies on United States v. Kennerley.21 In that case, Learned
Hand, then a federal district judge, protested against the Hicklin test that he
was reluctantly compelled to follow.
I hope it is not improper for me to say that the rule as laid down,
however consonant it may be with mid-Victorian morals, does not
seem to me to answer to the understanding and morality of the
present time, as conveyed by the words, "obscene, lewd, or las-
civious." I question whether in the end men will regard that as
obscene which is honestly relevant to the adequate expression of
innocent ideas, and whether they will not believe that truth and
beauty are too precious to society at large to be mutilated in the
interests of those most likely to pervert them to base uses. Indeed,
it seems hardly likely that we are even to-day so lukewarm in our
interest in letters or serious discussion as to be content to reduce
our treatment of sex to the standard of a child's library in the
supposed interest of a salacious few, or that shame will for long
prevent us from adequate portrayal of some of the most serious
and beautiful sides of human nature ....
• . . If there be no abstract definition, such as I have suggest-
ed, should not the word "obscene" be allowed to indicate the
present critical point in the compromise between candor and shame
at which the community may have arrived here and now? If letters
must, like other kinds of conduct, be subject to the social sense of
what is right, it would seem that a jury should in each case establish
the standard much as they do in cases of negligence. To put thought
17. A thorough analysis of the relationship between the cases cited by the Roth court and
the Roth test itself is contained in Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Devel-
oping Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 50-53 (1960).
18. See id. at 50-55.
19. Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1940); United States v.
Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936) (L. Hand, J.); Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass.
543, 551, 62 N.E.2d 840, 845 (1945); State v. Becker, 364 Mo. 1079, 1085, 272 S.W.2d 283, 286
(1954); Adams Theatre Co. v. Keenan, 12 N.J. 267, 271-72, 96 A.2d 519, 521 (1953); Common-
wealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101, 136 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1949), aff'd sub nora.
Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. Ct. 120, 70 A.2d 389 (1950) (per curiam).
20. Smith v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1756, 1763 n.6 (1977).
21. 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (L. Hand, J.).
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in leash to the average conscience of the time is perhaps tolerable,
but to fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and least capable
seems a fatal policy.22
What then were the meaning and purpose of community standards
when the concept was suggested by Learned Hand? It seems clear that
Hand, although not writing specifically in the context of constitutional
considerations of obscenity regulation,23 was aware of the dangers that the
Hicklin test could present to the free expression of ideas. In response,
therefore, he suggested that it was inappropriate to suppress anything inof-
fensive to current community standards in the name of controlling obsceni-
ty.24 In other words, Hand appreciated the separating function of a definition
of obscenity and suggested the community standards test as a means of
performing that function. It was to define and exclude a subset of constitu-
tionally protected materials that could not be suppressed from the entire set
of communications that would "deprave and corrupt" under the Hicklin
definition. The Hicklin test defined what was "bad" and should be con-
trolled; the community standards test was to define (and thus exclude from
regulation) what was "good." The two factors properly operated 4t cross
purposes, 25 together ensuring that only material that was corrupting and
worthless according to current standards would be subject to suppression.
In addition, the community standards concept appears to have been a
reaction against the Hicklin "most susceptible person" test. Hand seems to
have been saying that the focus of the obscenity determination should not be
on the weakest people in the community, but on the community at large,
here and now. It is this view that is embodied in the origin of the community
standards idea.
This historical excursus would be largely irrelevant but for the fact that
the majority opinion in Roth used the phrase "contemporary community
standards" in substantially the same way that it was intended and used by
Judge Hand in Kennerley. The Roth test as originally stated-"whether to
the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the domi-
nant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest'"26-
is noteworthy for the simplicity that is hidden in its juxtaposition of adjec-
tives and qualifiers. Beneath it all there is one and only one test-does the
22. Id. at 120-21 (emphasis added).
23. Pre-Roth cases tended to talk about what is or is not obscene in terms of whether the
applicable statutes proscribing obscenity had been violated. See, e.g., Walker v. Popenoe, 149
F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945); United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930).
24. 209 F. at 121.
25. This is analogous to current English law applying Hicklin for there is a defense of
"public good" even if the material is such as to "deprave and corrupt." See Obscene Publica-
tions Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 4.-(1); Davidow & O'Boyle, supra note 15, at 260.
26. 354 U.S. at 489.
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material appeal to the prurient interest? Everything else, including contem-
porary community standards, is there only to define how prurient interest
will be determined. The Court intended to emphasize two significant depar-
tures from the Hicklin test-first, that the work must be evaluated in its
entirety and not by reference to isolated passages and, second, that the work
must be evaluated in light of its effect on the average reader, and not on the
most susceptible person "into whose hands a publication of this sort may
fall. "27 That these were the only changes in the definition of obscenity
intended by the Court is the generally accepted reading of Roth.28
What, then, of the separating function of the definition? What is to
prevent the suppression of works of serious literary merit that also appeal to
the prurient interest of the average person? The answer is the same one that
occurred to Judge Hand. The check is the requirement that the average
person apply the present standards of the community as a whole. The
materials must offend contemporary notions of decency in the community if
they are to be suppressed. In other words, the contemporary community
standards factor in Roth merges into and affects the average person's view
of the material to exclude from the "obscene" category those materials that
the community recognizes as valuable or worthwhile. The use of "contem-
porary community standards" was intended, then, to emphasize the average
person concept, not to set up a separate test. The factor also highlights that it
is not the jurors' own personal reactions that are relevant, but some external
standard. 29 What matters is not how the juror feels, but how the juror thinks
the average person feels.
It seems unlikely that the Court was thinking of either local or national
standards when it used the phrase "contemporary community standards."
Historically the use of the concept had been in reference to the temporal, not
the geographical, aspects of the words.30 It was a warning to judges and
jurors to apply the standards of today's society, 31 not the standards of the
mid-Victorian era. 32 Thus, the use of "contemporary community stan-
dards" by the Roth court was intended to emphasize a contrast to the
Hicklin test.3 3 It was a check on the prurient interest concept designed to
27. Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. at 371.
28. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 17, at 53; see Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413, 441-42 (1966) (Clark, J., dissenting).
29. On the average person concept and the idea of an external standard, see F. SCHAUiER,
supra note 2, at 72-76.
30. Hence Judge Hand's reference to "mid-Victorian morals." 209 F. at 120.
31. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193 (1964) (plurality opinion by Brennan, J.). For a
discussion of the appropriateness of Mr. Justice Brennan's inference that this view suggests a
national community, see text accompanying note 49 infra.
32. 209 F. at 120.
33. See note 15 supra.
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ensure that nothing of value to today's society was denied first amendment
protection in the name of obscenity regulation.
This view of the purpose of the contemporary community standards
language is confirmed by the judgment in Alberts v. California,34 the
companion case to Roth. There, the Court affirmed a conviction although
the test applied by the lower court made no mention whatsoever of com-
munities or standards.35 Since the trial court had incorporated the need to
have the average person judge the material as a whole, the conviction was
held constitutionally sufficient. 36 This demonstrates the use of the Roth test
to perform a separating function. As long as the proceedings below were
generally designed to perform this function and thereby to prevent serious
literature from being designated obscene, the Constitution and the first
amendment were satisfied.
A form of contemporary community standards first became a necessary
component of the constitutional test for obscenity as a result of Mr. Justice
Harlan's opinion in Manual Enterprises v. Day.37 There he determined that
prurient interest alone could not adequately identify the legally obscene.
Therefore an additional test, that of patent offensiveness, was necessary to
place on the protected side of the obscenity line that speech which was worth
protecting.
To consider that the "obscenity" exception in "the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press," . . does not require
any determination as to the patent offensiveness vel non of the
material itself might well put the American public in jeopardy of
being denied access to many worthwhile works in literature, sci-
ence, or art. For one would not have to travel far even among the
acknowledged masterpieces in any of these fields to find works
whose "dominant theme" might, not beyond reason, be claimed to
appeal to the "prurient interest" of the reader or observer. We
decline to attribute to Congress any such quixotic and deadening
purpose as would bar from the mails all material, not patently
offensive, which stimulates impure desires relating to sex. Indeed
such a construction of § 1461 would doubtless encounter constitu-
tional barriers.
38
34. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Alberts and Roth were decided in one opinion.
35. The actual standard is not contained in the lower court opinion. People v. Alberts, 138
Cal. App. 2d 909, 292 P.2d 90 (1955). But neither the record nor the then controlling case of
People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P.2d 853 (1947), refers to community standards as
part of a definition of obscenity. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 17, at 24 n. 105, 54-55.
36. 354 U.S. at 489-90.
37. 370 U.S. 478 (1962). Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion was joined only by Mr. Justice
Stewart.
38. Id. at 487 (citations omitted). Although Mr. Justice Harlan suggested that patent
offensiveness was thus a constitutional requirement, he introduced the concept as a matter of
statutory interpretation. Id. at 482-87.
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Thus, Mr. Justice Harlan conceived of the patent offensiveness test as
performing the same basic "checking" function as Hand's community
standards. This part of the test definitively separates what is protected by the
first amendment from what is not speech by "putting back" within first
amendment protection true speech that was pulled out by the prurient
interest test. The prurient interest test alone provides an overinclusive
definition of obscenity; it is narrowed to proper scope by the additional
requirement that the material also be "patently offensive."
It is obvious, however, that material cannot be patently offensive in the
abstract. The very nature of the word "offensive" demands that something
or someone be offended. A frame of reference is needed, and the standards
of the contemporary community provide such a frame for the patent offen-
siveness concept. As a result, the second part of the two part obscenity test
required that the material be patently offensive to contemporary community
standards.
39
To Mr. Justice Harlan, patent offensiveness and contemporary commu-
nity standards were inseparable. In Manual Enterprises he stated, "These
magazines cannot be deemed so offensive on their face as to affront current
community standards of decency-a quality that we shall hereafter refer to
as 'patent offensiveness' or 'indecency.' "40 Mr. Justice Harlan advocated a
national standard for application of the federal statute at issue in Manual
Enterprises;4 more importantly, he used contemporary community stan-
dards not as an independent factor, but as the measure by which patent
offensiveness was to be judged. The patent offensiveness of the material, as
judged by contemporary community standards, was to serve as the primary
tool for ensuring that accepted literature, art, science or political commen-
tary was not suppressed as obscenity.42 This role of contemporary communi-
ty standards is underscored by the fact that Harlan saw the determination as
ultimately a matter of constitutional law for final resolution by the Supreme
Court.4 3
Jacobellis v. Ohio,' decided two years later, marked the Court's first
acknowledgment of the "utterly without redeeming social importance"
39. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
40. 370 U.S. at 482.
41. Id. at 488.
42. Id. at 487.
43. Id. at 488-90. The necessity of the "independent examination" referred to in Manual
Enterprises was explained in detail in Roth. 354 U.S. at 496-98 (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). On the obligation of independent review, see also Miller v. California,
413 U.S. at 29-30; Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188 (1964) (plurality opinion by Brennan,
J.).
44. 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (the Court's plurality opinion was written by Mr. Justice Brennan
and joined by Mr. Justice Goldberg).
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test.4' The incorporation of this factor led directly to the current confusion
regarding the patent offensiveness concept and the idea of contemporary
community standards. In his plurality opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan reaf-
firmed the prurient interest test of Roth' and acknowledged the need for the
patent offensiveness test set forth in Manual Enterprises .47 He also added
the observation that, if obscenity is utterly without redeeming social value
(Roth), then only expressions that are determined to be socially worthless
are in fact obscene. 48 While one might differ over wording, the concept is
sound. Since the two-level theory is based on obscenity not being speech at
all, then utterances having the characteristics of speech (value) must not be
obscene. And if social value is a defining characteristic of speech, only that
which is without that value can be removed from the speech category and
treated as obscene. The entire Roth analysis hinges on this point. Thus,
whatever tests are employed must guarantee that socially valuable com-
munications are not denominated obscene. This point is recognized in Roth
by the rejection of the Hicklin test and in Manual Enterprises by the use of
the patent offensiveness test. Both of these cases tried to choose a definition
that would separate valuable communications and keep them within first
amendment protection. The "utterly without redeeming social importance"
test and the "patently offensive to contemporary community standards" test
perform one and the same function-that of ensuring that the prurient
interest test does not inadvertently catch some speech.
Mr. Justice Brennan correctly noted in Jacobellis that Judge Hand
referred in Kennerley not to state and local communities, "but rather to 'the
community' in the sense of society at large; . . .the public, or people in
general." 49 But although "community" refers to society at large, it need
not be defined as a national community. What actually follows from the use
of this word, and what Hand seems to have intended, is that "community"
should not be defined at all, except perhaps as the generally accepted values
of modern society. In other words, that which is offensive to contemporary
community standards is the same as that which is utterly without redeeming
social importance. The concepts are substantially identical and were design-
ed to serve the same purpose. The real error of Mr. Justice Brennan's
opinion in Jacobellis is in assuming that two wholly different concepts were
involved. Although wording may suggest some differences in breadth of
45. Id. at 191.
46. Id.; see text accompanying note 26 supra.
47. 378 U.S. at 191-92.
48. Id. at 191.
49. Id. at 193.
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coverage, they are both directed to the same end and are different statements
of the same idea.
From here the development of the community standards concept fol-
lows a natural course. The three separate standards to which Mr. Justice
Brennan referred in Jacobellis "coalesced" into a three part test in Memoirs
v. Massachusetts. °
[I]t must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the
material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary
community standards relating to the description or representation
of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming
social value."'
The Memoirs test did properly take community standards out of (a). The
"contemporary community standards" language was a part of the prurient
interest test in Roth because the combined standard was the entirety of the
Roth test. Thus, in Roth, one test served the purposes of (a) and (b). With
(a), (b) and (c) as separate parts of the test, there remained no need to refer
to prurient interest in the context of community standards, and the Memoirs
court properly did not do so.
But Memoirs did perpetuate the error of Jacobellis by not recognizing
that (b) and (c) were directed at the same end, the withdrawal of communi-
cations of social value from the overinclusive reach of the prurient interest
test. The concept of patent offensiveness in (b), incorporating contemporary
community standards, served no purpose not served by part (c) of the
Memoirs test.
This duplication continued in Miller,52 despite that opinion's criticism
of the wording of the Memoirs test.53 By preserving the three part structure
50. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). Although Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion was joined only by Chief
Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Fortas, the concurrences of Justices Black, Stewart and
Douglas gave the Memoirs opinion the effect of a majority opinion. See F. SCHAUER, supra
note 2, at 138-39. Although the Court suggested in Miller that the Memoirs opinion was weak
precedent ("that concept has never commanded the adherence of more than three Justices at
one time," 413 U.S. at 25), it has since acknowledged that the Memoirs opinion of Mr. Justice
Brennan had the effect of a majority holding. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193-94
(1977).
51. 383 U.S. at 418.
52. The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average
person, applying contemporary community standards," would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,. . . (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.
413 U.S. at 24.
53. Id. at 22 (noting that the "utterly without redeeming social value" standard created "a




of the Memoirs formula, Miller also preserves the separateness of the
"patently offensive" and "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value" factors, thereby sustaining the error established in Jacobellis. The
Miller Court's desire to repudiate the precedential -effect of Memoirs and
demonstrate the fundamental continuity of approach from Roth to Miller,
54
however, led to the verbatim use of the Roth prurient interest formulation
including the reference to contemporary community standards. 55 This serv-
ed only to compound the error, since the community standards part of the
Roth definition was intended to embody the values now separately ex-
pressed in the patent offensiveness and social value standards. The Court
has since made clear in Smith v. United States56 that community standards
apply to the second, or patent offensiveness, part as well as the prurient
interest part of the Miller test. 7
To recapitulate, the concept of contemporary community standards was
conceived by Judge Hand and used by the Roth court to ensure that
protected speech, defined loosely as the transmission of ideas, did not fall
on the wrong side of the line dividing obscenity from protected expression.
This function has since been taken over by the patent offensiveness standard
of Mr. Justice Harlan and then in turn by "utterly without redeeming social
value" and "without serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
Thus, the concept of contemporary community standards has been replaced
in function by other tests and exists in the current test only as excess
baggage, carried on solely by an uncritical lifting of language from one case
to another without regard for the purpose the language was intended to
serve.
I1. THE ROLE OF "CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY STANDARDS" IN A
DEFINITIONAL APPROACH TO OBSCENYry
Showing that history does not support the present use of the contempor-
ary community standards concept does not by itself warrant discarding the
concept as irrelevant. It does, however, present a clean slate on which to
examine the purpose of the obscenity definition's various parts and the role
that the "contemporary community standards" concept plays in each part.
This section of the article, then, will evaluate the role of each portion of the
54. Id. at 21-23. See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 54.
55. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
56. 97 S. Ct. 1756 (1977).
57. Id. at 1763. This application had previously been implied in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418
U.S. 153, 159 (1974), and Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-06 (1974). A close reading
of Miller yields the same conclusion. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 122-23. See also United
States v. B & H Dist. Corp., 375 F. Supp. 136, 141 (W.D. Wis. 1974); McCauley v. Tropic of
Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 149, 121 N.W.2d 545, 553 (1963).
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obscenity test and consider what, if anything, the contemporary community
standards concept can add to that portion. It is especially important here for
the reader to bear in mind the essential separating function that the defini-
tion of obscenity performs in the two-level theory.
58
A. Appeal to the Prurient Interest
The concept of appeal to the prurient interest provides the strongest
conceptual justification for the two-level theory. If there are utterances that
are not speech (and their existence is by no means as absurd a proposition as
is often suggested59) then, according to the rationale of Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 60 what prevents them from being speech is that they do not deal
in ideas .61 But what is an idea? Certainly any conception of ideas in terms of
beliefs 62 would exclude most entertainment, art, science and the like from
the protection of the first amendment-clearly an unacceptable proposition.
Rather, the notion of an idea suggests something that engenders a response
in the mind of the reader or hearer as a result of at least some thinking,
reason or reflection and that operates primarily as a cognitive stimulus.
63
Assuming this, the prurient interest requirement must be designed to ex-
clude those utterances from the first amendment that are not speech because
they do not deal in ideas and do not appeal to one's cognitive processes.
It is futile to try to ascertain the legal concept of prurient interest by
resort to dictionary definitions of the words "prurient" or "pruriency. "64
58. See text accompanying notes 9-14 supra.
59. The very nature of the special concern for content regulation suggests that it is not the
words themselves but what the words express or do that is protected by the first amendment.
Thus, it follows that there is some property that words must have in order for them to be
speech. From a purely philosophical approach, it is thus possible to imagine words without that
property, and therefore for there to be words that are not speech. Cf. Finnis, supra note 7
(suggesting that speech is that which appeals to the "reason"). On content discrimination and
regulation, see generally Ely, supra note 9; Karst, supra note 7; Nimmer, The Meaning of
Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 29 (1973); Scanlon, A
Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. ArF. 204 (1972).
60. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
61. Id. at 572. There is some question whether the Chaplinsky rationale was properly
applied in Chaplinsky itself.
62. See, e.g., 5 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICnONARY 1-15 (1933) (defining an idea as "a concep-
tion of what is desirable or ought to be").
63. "By ideas I mean the faint images of [sensations, passions and emotions] in thinking
and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse,
excepting only, those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate
pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion." D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 1 (1st ed.
L. Shelby-Bigge 1888, reprint 1960). Hume's basic distinction was between impressions and
ideas, but he recognized that the line between them could often blur. Id. at 1-2. See also 1 J.
LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, ch. I, § 8, at 47 (4th ed. 1700, reprint
P. Nidditch 1975) (referring to ideas in terms of thinking and understanding). Locke also uses
the word "idea" in a somewhat broader sense to include perception. 2 id. ch. VIII, § 8, at 134.
64. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 98-99.
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Some of these definitions tell us why a society might want to regulate
obscene publications, 65 but that is not an issue under a definitional ap-
proach. The dictionary definitions do not tell us why materials appealing to
the prurient interest are not speech, and this is the question that must be
answered if the Roth analysis is followed. In the context of a definitional
theory of obscenity and speech, the concept of prurient interest seems to
imply some immediate, non-cognitive, non-reasoning stimulation. 66 Most
often, it seems, this stimulus is plainly physical, or something close to it (no
one who writes about obscenity law will admit to knowing exactly what the
stimulus is). It may also be what Mr. Justice Harlan referred to as "psychic
stimulation." 
67
The significance of the immediate non-cognitive stimulation is such
that it is then relatively easy to class such utterances as conduct rather than
speech. 68 In other words, this conception of prurient interest requires that
obscenity, by definition, be "mainly conduct and little speech. " 69 Seen in
this light, obscenity, defined so as to equate it with hard-core pornography,
65. See the collected definitions in Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20. Some of the definitions
there presented show remarkably little similarity. In particular, that which excites lustful
thoughts has a very different connotation from that which is shameful or morbid. For a
philosophical analysis that is "taken in" by the Court's reference to morbid and shameful, see
Crawford, Can Disputes Over Censorship be Resolved?, 78 ETHICS 93, 104 (1968). For discus-
sions of pornography in which aesthetic philosophers and others focus on the prurient interest
idea, see P. MICHELSON, THE AESTHETICS OF PORNOGRAPHY (1971); M. PECKHAM, ART AND
PORNOGRAPHY (1969); PERSPECTIvEs ON PORNOGRAPHY (D. Hughes ed. 1970). See also D.H.
LAWRENCE, PORNOGRAPHY AND OBSCENrrY (1929); D.H. LAWRENCE, SEX, LrrERATURE, AND
CENSORSHIP (1953).
66. This has been called an appeal to passion as opposed to an appeal to reason. Finnis,
supra note 7, at 227-30.
67. Harlan was making the point that this does not occur when one sees a jacket with the
words "FUCK THE DRAFT" on it. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). "It cannot
plausibly be maintained that this vulgar allusion to the Selective Service System would conjure
up such psychic stimulation in anyone likely to be confronted with Cohen's crudely defaced
jacket." Id. at 20. Professor Ely's characterization is too good not to be repeated. "[A]nyone
who finds Cohen's jacket 'obscene' or erotic had better have his valves checked." Ely, supra
note 9, at 1493.
68. The chief proponent of this distinction would put obscenity in the speech category,
however. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, supra note 10, at 937-
39. While Professor Emerson's expressiontaction distinction does not seem to serve as an
effective doctrinal tool for free speech adjudication in general, it does add some support to the
Chaplinsky-Roth thesis by acknowledging that some words may not be speech. But in many
constitutional contexts the distinction is conclusory and merely provides doctrinal labels for
what has been decided on other, unexpressed grounds to be worthy or unworthy of first
amendment protection. Professor Emerson's placing of obscenity on the expression side does
not seem supported by the distinction itself. For a philosophical elaboration of the Emerson
thesis, see Fuchs, Further Steps Toward a General Theory of Freedom of Expression, 18 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 347 (1976).
69. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It is important
to bear in mind the distinction between speech as action (shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theater
and perhaps hard-core pornography and purely private libel) and speech with action (picketing,
sound trucks, some forms of symoblic speech). One of the problems with the expression/action
dichotomy is that it does not adequately explore or accommodate this distinction.
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can be viewed primarily as a physial experience, albeit with some aspects
of a type of mental activity. This does not seem wholly unlike what
presumably occurs to the patron of a massage parlor, and a first amendment
challenge to massage parlor regulation would properly be deemed frivo-
lous.70 If this analogy to the massage parlor is apt, then the only distinction
is whether the effect is produced by words or pictures on the one hand or
direct physical stimulus on the other; this distinction appears somewhat
trivial. 71 This illustration highlights the proper conception of appeal to the
prurient interest, which envisions an immediate non-cognitive response
approaching actual physical stimulation. If this is the case, the distinction
between obscenity (not speech) and all other uses of language and pictures
(speech) does not seem at all ridiculous.
A defense of the two-level theory as applied to hard-core pornography
is best left for another time. For present purposes it is sufficient to say that if
prurient interest is conceived as implying physical or quasi-physical stimula-
tion, then a finding of appeal to the prurient interest is primarily an evalua-
tion that is either intuitive ("I know it when I see it, 17), or behavioral. The
concept of contemporary community standards does not seem particularly
applicable in either case. Neither an intuitive evaluation nor a psychological
or physiological response is likely to vary appreciably from place to place.
More importantly, the concept of appeal to the prurient interest does not
necessarily demand a geographic reference point, as does the notion of
patent offensiveness. Determinations of prurient interest are primarily ques-
tions of fact for the jury.73 Even recognizing, however, that juries in
different places may see things differently, it does not follow that contem-
porary community standards must become part of this aspect of the obsceni-
ty definition, any more than they are part of any other factual determination
with constitutional implications. The observation in Miller that standards
differ from place to place74 proves too much, since there is no reason to
-believe that the same things could not be said about "clear and present
70. Most challenges to massage parlor regulation have been on vagueness or equal protec-
tion grounds. See, e.g., Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 387 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.
Pa. 1974), rev'd, 524 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1975); Lancaster v. Municipal Ct., 6 Cal. 3d 805,494 P.2d
681, 100 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1972).
71. This is an area of rather difficult line drawing, as the cases involving live performances
and topless and bottomless bars demonstrate. A line drawn at the point at which the performer
physically touches the viewer is easily applied but theoretically weak. See generally F.
SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 200-05; Comment, The First Amendment Onstage, 53 B.U.L. REV.
1121 (1973). More attention to the actual and intended effect on the viewer and less attention to
the amount of clothing worn by the performers would clarify most cases. See Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
72. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
73. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 159 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 30,
74. 413 U.S. at 30-34.
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danger" 75 or "reckless disregard for the truth" 76 or any other constitutional
test to be applied by a jury. Others have noted that the community standards
idea does not appear suited to determinations of appeal to the prurient
interest,77 and the Miller court's view to the contrary seems, as discussed
previously, 78 to be based solely on the fact that the original Roth test
attempted to integrate too many different factors into one phrase.
B. Patent Offensiveness
The concept of patent offensiveness presents difficulties of a different
order. These words necessitate a reference point. Although community
standards were not mentioned in Miller in regard to this part of the test, the
Court has now properly recognized the relationship of the community
standards concept to the determination of patent offensiveness. 79 As Mr.
Justice Harlan suggested in Manual Enterprises, community standards and
patent offensiveness are inseparable,80 But a closer look at the concept of
patent offensiveness itself is required because, as previously stated, its
original purpose has been supplanted by the test of "serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value." Putting history aside, the basic question is
simple: Is the requirement that material be patently offensive to the commu-
nity necessary or helpful to a constitutional obscenity test? A negative
answer seems compelled.
First, the offensiveness of language has never been thought to be
relevant to whether speech is constitutionally protected.81 The very fact of
regulation generally indicates that someone is offended by the words spo-
ken, and one of the foundations of the first amendment seems to be the
principle that society cannot regulate all use of language that its members
find objectionable.82 In fact, many forms of protected speech are probably
considerably more offensive to the majority of the community than hard-
core pornography.8 3
The exclusion of the patent offensiveness concept, in the same way that.
offense to the community is excluded from all other determinations of the
75. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
76. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280-81 (1964).
77. See McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 149, 121 N.W.2d 545, 553 (1963).
78. See text accompanying notes 22-57 supra.
79. Smith v. United States, 97 S. Ct. at 1763; Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 159 (1974).
80. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
81. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564
(1970); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). In fact, offensiveness alone clearly does not
justify singling out sexually explicit material for special regulation. See Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975).
82. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975).
83. For example, showing contempt for the flag. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405
(1974); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
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scope of the first amendment, does not make any substantive difference in
the application of the definitional theory of obscenity regulation. If certain
words or pictures do not convey any ideas or thoughts, lack any serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value, and are intended to and do in
fact have a predominantly physical and immediate effect (prurient appeal),
then under any rational interpretation of the two-level theory they are not
speech, regardless of whether anyone is offended or not. Conversely, if
ideas are conveyed, the material has some value or the words or pictures
have a cognitive effect, then again, by any reasonable construction of the
two-level theory, no amount of offense to any community can take them out
of the category of speech. This latter concept is acknowledged by the Court
insofar as an affirmative finding on each aspect of the Miller test is a
necessary condition for a finding of obscenity.84 Thus, since patent offen-
siveness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a determination
of obscenity, it is not logically part of the definition of obscenity. It is mere
surplusage.
A second and related point is that patent offensiveness implies commu-
nity rejection. But community acceptance or rejection seems to be a pecu-
liarly legislative matter, especially unsuited as part of a definition of speech.
What makes something speech under the Chaplinsky-Roth hypothesis is the
fact that ideas are conveyed, that thoughts are involved, that a response
requires some use of the mental faculties.8 5 None of these factors varies in
any way according to the degree of community acceptance or rejection.
What may vary is the community's willingness to allow the dissemina-
tion of prurient material. If a community wishes to accept what is solely
prurient and wholly valueless, however, the most apt recourse would seem
to be decriminalization, not a definition of obscenity that sweeps into the
speech category everything the community will tolerate.8 6 The result of such
a definition is that the first amendment casts in constitutional terms the
majority's legislative preferences. This is an inappropriate use of constitu-
tional power. If a community operating under this definition wishes to reject
what is not prurient or does contain some value, then the first amendment
will properly stop them.
84. 413.U.S. at 24.
85. See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
86. In Miller, Chief Justice Burger suggests that national standards may have a "chilling
effect" since they might result in materials being "unavailable where they are acceptable." 413
U.S. at 32 n.13. This could not occur if community enforcement practices or legislation
accurately reflected community standards, which will most often be the case. See Schauer,
Obscenity and the Conflict of Laws, supra note 3, at 380 n.18.
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Imagine, for example, a motion picture that appeals to the prurient
interest and lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value, but
does not offend the relevant community. Can the community suppress the
movie? The answer under the present obscenity test is no. The movie is
protected as speech because the community accepts it. Why, then, would
they want to suppress it? If one assumes that community legislation reflects
community standards, this is an exercise in circularity. But, as Smith v.
United States87 points out, this assumption is not always correct. 88 When
legislation fails to reflect community standards, then, the patent offensive-
ness test will use the first amendment to invalidate that legislation. This has
nothing to do with what is or is not speech, unless speech is defined as that
which the community accepts.
89
What is wrong with saying that those materials that are not offensive
are speech, because utterances that do not repulse the community are
entitled to retain this protected status? In other words, should there not be a
presumption (rebuttable under a definitional theory) that all utterances are
speech? If so, the patent offensiveness concept is merely a device to make it
more difficult to rebut this presumption and thereby to protect first amend-
ment values. But those values are already protected by the requirement that
material be without redeeming social value before it may be suppressed as
obscene. The sole dimension added by the patent offensiveness test is the
constitutional protection of socially valueless communications because a
community wants them.
The concept of patent offensiveness, then, cannot sensibly be related to
the determination of what is or is not speech. It can be related to the
community's justification for regulation, but under a strict definitional
theory of obscenity those justifications are not a matter of concern. The
concept of patent offensiveness is thus fundamentally at odds with the
theoretical underpinnings of the two-level theory.
There are real dangers inherent in too broad a definition of obscenity.
The patent offensiveness test has the pragmatic goal of ensuring that real
speech is not mistakenly defined as obscenity. 9 This is an admirable goal,
87. 97 S. Ct. 1756 (1977).
88. Id. at 1766.
89. The converse situation occurs when the community is offended but no legislative
action is taken. This is surely not a constitutional matter. There may be many reasons the
community chooses not to regulate offensive matter, and since patent offensiveness without
legislation cannot result in prosecution, this is not a practical problem.
90. In other words, the erroneous designation of obscenity as speech is a less serious error
than the erroneous designation of speech as obscenity. A substantial hurdle to a finding of
obscenity must be erected to make certain that the latter error will be much less frequent than
the former. This is analogous to the purpose of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in
criminal law. This process of identifying and attempting to minimize the more serious error
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but are the words "patently offensive" suited to perform this function? It
seems likely that reference to community standards would work the other
way and condemn that which ought to be protected. If the goal is to
strengthen the test, the addition of inappropriate concepts does not seem the
way to do it.
Moreover, a definition of obscenity, under present theory, is designed
to separate speech from valueless words. It is primarily and ultimately a
judgment of constitutional fact, as to which the views of the community are
remarkably inappropriate. This becomes apparent in Jenkins v. Georgia.91
In that case the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Rehnquist, did
not reverse the Supreme Court of Georgia because Carnal Knowledge had
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value, although this would
have been the easiest course. 92 The decision was reversed because the movie
was not patently offensive. 93 How did Mr. Justice Rehnquist know that? He
did not purport to know the community standards of Georgia. Rather, he
said that certain things are simply not patently offensive, referring primarily
to the "hard-core" concept and the examples given in Miller.94 This
determination is actually and ultimately a finding that the movie was a mild
(non-prurient) and critically respected95 effort (of serious literary value).
Would it not have been more straightforward to reverse on these
grounds rather than to say that the Georgians did not know the standards of
their own community? The very fact that community standards are subject
to judicial review undermines their claim to theoretical legitimacy. This, of
course, is no less true of national community standards. The Court in Miller
was clearly right in saying that national standards are "hypothetical and
unascertainable. "96 The Court's error was in assuming that the only logical
alternative was the local community standard. This alternative was more
realistic, but it was also logically inconsistent with the very purpose of a
constitutional definition of obscenity. Unfortunately, the Court did not
(erroneous conviction in the criminal process) was most clearly explained by Mr. Justice Harlan
in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369-74 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See generally Kaplan,
Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1065 (1968).
Since it is likely that determinations of obscenity are more prone to error than the factual
determinations in most criminal trials, this analysis would seem especially applicable to obscen-
ity law. For an application of this method of analysis to the first amendment (where erroneous
infringement of expression and belief can be equated with erroneous deprivations of personal
liberty), see Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
91. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
92. This factor "is particularly amenable to appellate review." Smith v. United States, 97
S. Ct. at 1766.
93. 418 U.S. at 161.
94. Id. at 160-61.
95. Id. at 158.
96. 413 U.S. at 31.
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realize that there was another alternative, that of discarding the geographical
reference entirely.97
The patent offensiveness test thus has one of two possible effects.
Either the determination whether material is "patently offensive to contem-
porary community standards" is an independent test, in which case it is
fundamentally inconsistent with a definitional approach to obscenity, or it
duplicates functionally, as it does historically,9" the notion of "valueless-
ness." It is therefore appropriate to turn to the question whether the concept
of contemporary community standards has any place in the last part of the
Miller test, which requires that material defined as obscene lack "serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.''
99
C. Serious Literary, Artistic, Political or Scientific Value
As previously suggested, 1°° this last part of the Miller test, the current
version of the old "utterly without redeeming social value" test, most
clearly embodies what Judge Hand contemplated when he first suggested
that community standards had a place in the determination of obscenity.
Obviously the concept of "value," like the concept of "offensiveness,"
must have some external referent. But the referent here is not necessarily
geographical.
This part of the test carries the main weight of removing anything that
looks like speech from the definition of obscenity. As such, it embodies the
basic principles of the first amendment-protecting the transmission of
thoughts, information and ideas. Clearly this factor cannot vary regionally,
a point that the Supreme Court has in the past implicitly recognized 10 ' and
that it has recently explicitly. held. 1 2 But a national geographic standard
seems no more realistic here than for any other part of the test.
This problem can be solved if courts do not assume that "contemporary
community standards" refers to some specific geographic locality. The
intention here is that the inherently subjective determination of value must
be made in light of society's current standards of value,0 3 just as determina-
97. Deemphasis of the geographic component of contemporary community standards has
been previously suggested. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 17, at 112-14.
98. See text accompanying and following notes 44-48 supra.
99. 413 U.S. at 24.
100. See text following note 57 supra.
101. In Miller, the Court talked about local community standards only in reference to
prurient interest and patent offensiveness. 413 U.S. at 30. The omission of the third part of the
Miller test from the discussion of local standards suggested that local standards were to be
applied only to the first two parts of the test.
102. Smith v. United States, 97 S. Ct. at 1764.
103. See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.
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tions of "value" in other areas of constitutional law and the first amendment
are made without use of any geographic referent.' 04 The reference to society
in general is all that is implied and is important primarily to remind the jury
that they are not to consider whether a particular reader or viewer would find
value in the material or whether they, the jurors, would find it to have some
personal value. 1 5 That is, it reminds the jury to apply an external standard.
Geographic references of any kind are neither necessary nor tolerable.
Further, the approval of instructions that incorporate no geographic bound-
aries into the reference to community standardsI°6 has stripped the idea of
community standards of most of its geographic meaning. Without a specific
geographic reference, there is even less conceptual or pragmatic purpose for
using "contemporary community standards" than before.
Perhaps part of the problem is that, although the "serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value" factor is clearly a matter of basic
constitutional law, the Court has referred to the prurient interest and patently
offensive characteristics as being primarily questions of fact, 107 The Court,
however, must not lose sight of the distinction between factual findings as
an element of the offense and those same factual findings as delineating the
line between constitutional protection and non-protection. 108 While it is true
that the people of Maine or Mississippi need not "accept public depiction of
conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City,"'109 it is not true
that the people of Maine or Mississippi have a right to legislatively reject
what is in fact speech merely because they do not accept it. Thus, by
defining speech in terms of varying geographic standards, the Court allows
the permissible limits of state power to vary according to the desires of that
state-certainly a radical departure from accepted notions in constitutional
law. Of course tastes and desires vary, but this variation is normally
expressed in terms of varying legislative solutions, not in varying degrees of
constitutional protection.
104. For example, the balancing process now mandated for commercial speech, Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976),
recognizes that the value of speech is now relevant, but makes no reference to geographic
variability.
105. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 172 n.3 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
106. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. at 157; Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-06
(1974).
107. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. at 159; Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 30.
108. See generally Note, Supreme Court Review of Fact Finding by State Courts, 34
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1118 (1959).
109. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 32.
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D. The Effect of the Current Use of Contemporary Community Standards
If one incorporates into the Court's present definition and use of the
concept of contemporary community standards what can be gleaned from
this analysis and from the cases subsequent to Miller, the following princi-
ple emerges: since that which is not obscene is speech and is thus protected
by the first amendment, the Supreme Court must review state determina-
tions of obscenity to ensure that they do not include speech. The Court will
review closely and independently all state determinations that material is
lacking in serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. Due to the
added discretion given localities by the contemporary community standards
test, the Court will review somewhat less closely determinations of prurient
interest and patent offensiveness. Seen in this way, the concept of communi-
ty standards becomes almost as irrelevant in practice as it is in theory. It is,
at bottom, a minor grant of discretion to lower courts in close cases.
110
Although the discretionary component is small, however, there seems no
principled way to say that the Court should review less carefully the contents
of Hustler than it reviewed the contents of Brandenburg's speech' or the
words on Cohen's jacket.1
2
It should be apparent that the conceptof national community standards
is as amorphous and unprovable as the Court surmised in Miller. On the
other hand, the concept of local community standards is fundamentally
inconsistent with other areas of first amendment theory. Neither formulation
serves any purpose under the definitional approach to obscenity. The Court
was right in Miller in rejecting the national standards concept of Jacobellis.
It was wrong in thinking it had to be replaced with something else.
III. SMITH V. UNITED STATESm-THE SUPREME COURT MovEs TOWARDS
RMlECrION OF COMMUNITY STANDARDS
The foregoing argument was made necessary by the recent attention
paid to the effect of local community standards. There is reason to believe
that the Court is inclined towards abandoning the geographic aspects of
110. This view seems to form part of the basis for the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v.
United States, 97 S. Ct. 1756 (1977). See text accompanying notes 119-26 infra. In the sense
that the community standards concept becomes a factor only in the close cases, it is analagous
to the "pandering" concept of Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). Pandering
remains a factor in determinations of obscenity. Splawn v. California, 97 S. Ct. 1987 (1977).
111. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
112. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Conversely, there seems no principled way to
say that a magazine may not be made illegal and suppressed by a local community (assuming the
two-level theory) if its sole claim to constitutional protection is its acceptance by a national
audience. If the magazine appeals to the prurient interest and if it is in fact without serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value, the demands of the Constitution, given the two-
level theory, have been satisfied.
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contemporary community standards. The main source of that belief is the
recent opinion in Smith v. United States.'13
The issue presented in Smith was narrow and uncluttered by legal or
factual complications. Smith was prosecuted and convicted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1461114 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Iowa for mailing several sexually explicit magazines from Des Moines,
Iowa to Mount Ayr, Iowa and Guthrie, Iowa. It was not a crime in Iowa at
any relevant time to send or distribute obscene materials to adults. The trial
court admitted into evidence the absence of Iowa law proscribing this
activity, but refused to give it conclusive effect. This action was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"15 and then by the Supreme
Court, Mr. Justice Blackmun writing the opinion for the five member
majority.
116
Given the legal precedents, the issue was relatively easy. If the local
community standards concept is part of the definition of obscenity, it is
equally applicable in state and federal prosecutions.1 17 Furthermore, if
obscenity is not in fact speech, the scope of federal power under the
Constitution undoubtedly involves intrastate transactions involving obsceni-
ty and employing the mails.
118
The Court first acknowledged that neither literary, artistic, political nor
scientific value should be governed by the local community standards
idea.1 9 This too, although expressed clearly for the first time in Smith, was
deducible from the earlier cases.' 2° The Court then turned to the real issue in
the case:
[W]hether the jury's discretion to determine what appeals to
the prurient interest and what is patently offensive is circumscribed
in any way by a state statute such as c. 725 of the Iowa Code. Put
another way, we must decide whether the jury is entitled to rely on
its own knowledge of community standards, or whether a state
113. 97 S. Ct. 1756 (1977).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
115. 97 S. Ct. at 1762. The Eighth Circuit's per curiam opinion was not reported.
116. Id. at 1759. Mr. Justice Stevens, although clearly on record as permitting some
controls on obscenity, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), dissented in
Smith, repeating his objections to criminal prosecutions for obscenity. 97 S. Ct. at 1769
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
117. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105 (1974); United States v. 12 200-Ft.
Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 129-30 (1973).
118. The predecessor of 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) was first upheld against
commerce clause attacks in Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877) (lotteries), and In re Rapier,
143 U.S. 110 (1892) (lotteries). A similar challenge was rejected in Roth. 354 U.S. at 492-94.
119. 97 S. Ct. at 1763.
120. F. SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 123-24.
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legislature (or a smaller legislative body) may declare what the
community standards shall be, and, if such a declaration has been
made, whether it is binding in a federal prosecution under § 1461.121
The answer was clear. To acknowledge that the community could by
legislation impose standards on everyone would make community standards
and community legislation congruent. As explained previously, this would
expose the nakedness of the whole community standards idea. The only
recourse was to acknowledge that standards and legislation are different,
declining to give the Iowa statute binding effect in the federal prosecution.
This is an uncomfortable analysis of the real meaning of local community
standards, however, as the Court's attempts to explain this variance
show. 1
22
The significance of Smith is that the Court seems to be backing further
away from the geographic conception of contemporary community stan-
dards. This retreat started with Hamling v. United States 123 and Jenkins v.
Georgia,124 in which the Court held that instructions as to a specific
geographic community were unnecessary and that each juror's own notion
of the relevant community was quite sufficient. In Smith, the Court referred
to juror discretion in the determination of those elements of the obscenity
test to which community standards apply. 1" This underscores the point that
the real significance of contemporary community standards is the scope of
review of factual determinations and the permissible tolerance of variation
in those determinations. 126 The Smith Court also referred to the use of
"contemporary community standards" in Roth, pointing out that the con-
cept serves primarily to ensure that the jury does not rely on an "atypical
subset" of the community.127 As support for this interpretation of the
meaning of "contemporary community standards," the Court quoted
Learned Hand in Kennerley for the original meaning of the idea.128 The
Smith opinion, then, shows a recognition that the reference is to "society at
large" without any geographic conception. In other words, the key term is
not "community" but "contemporary." If the Court follows the path set in
Smith it may, and should, drop both the geographic construction of contem-
121. 97 S. Ct. at 1764.
122. See id. at 1764-65.
123. 418 U.S. 87, 104-06 (1974).
124. 418 U.S. at 157.
125. 97 S. Ct. at 1766.
126. See text accompanying notes 110-12 supra.
127. "Mhe Court has never varied from the Roth position that the community as a whole
should be the judge of obscenity, and not a small, atypical subset of the community." 97 S. Ct.
at 1763 n.6.
128. Id. at 1763 n.7.
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porary community standards and the patent offensiveness test that is its
natural corollary.
IV. CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY STANDARDS AND THE STATE
INTEREST IN OBSCENITY REGULATION
Thus far this article has urged the rejection of the twin anomalies of
obscenity law, the patent offensiveness concept and contemporary commu-
nity standards. This rejection should take place on the ground that these
elements are fundamentally inconsistent with the definitional theory of
obscenity regulation to which the Court continues to subscribe. In reality,
the patent offensiveness idea is itself a rejection of the theory because it is,
more than a definition, a reason for governmental control. If obscenity is
not speech, such reasons are superfluous to the constitutional question.
Therefore, the inclusion of this factor in the test exposes a possible weak-
ness of the two-level theory by requiring a higher justification for the
regulation of this type of non-speech than is necessary for other types of
non-speech. The community must be offended before regulation is per-
mitted.
If the definitional approach is abandoned, the contemporary communi-
ty standards idea might be appropriate under an approach to obscenity that
treated it as a class of speech and then required some degree of state
justification for its regulation. That the Court may be heading away from the
strict definitional approach and towards an evaluation of reasons is not
inconceivable. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. ,129 the Court
looked to the state's reasons for the regulation at issue and may have started
a turn from the definitional approach and toward evaluation of the state's
reasons in all obscenity cases.
If the Court should broaden the general approach of Young to all
obscenity questions, the result would probably still be a categorizing,
definitional approach. Any change from the present approach would in all
likelihood be a form of definitional balancing in which the court evaluates
the justifications for a particular type of regulation, such as licensing or
distribution prohibitions for "consenting adults."
But this approach, while looking to the community's general interest in
suppressing what offends it, will have little use for an evaluation of the
129. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). In Young, the Court permitted the regulation by zoning of adult
theaters and adult bookstores, even though there was no requirement in the Detroit ordinance at
issue that the materials available in adult establishments be legally obscene under the Miller
definition. In allowing this type of regulation and in analyzing the reasons why it would be
permitted, the Court seemed to approach a less definitional and more variable, or contextual,
approach to obscenity. See Schauer, supra note 7.
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offensiveness of each particular magazine or motion picture, or for a
determination of whether a particular community is offended by a particular
publication. While it is difficult to predict what, if anything, the Court will
do, one can say with confidence that the concept of contemporary communi-
ty standards will be no more relevant under an approach that treats obscenity
as a class of speech /han it is under the current approach, which treats
obscenity as non-speech.
V. CONCLUSION
The concept of contemporary community standards exists in present
day obscenity law only by historical accident. Its use in the Miller definition
of obscenity cannot be traced to any prior, analogous use of the contempor-
ary community standards formulation. Moreover, it is at once irrelevant to
and fundamentally inconsistent with the definitional approach now used by
the Court, and would be no more helpful under any other approach.
A rejection of the contemporary community standards concept and its
partner in crime, patent offensiveness, would not decrease the protection
that the first amendment now affords, nor would it change the treatment of
obscenity in a way that would be unacceptable to the current Court. Rather,
it would result in a two part test with an additional check. The two parts
would be: First, the determination of appeal to the prurient interest that
identifies the non-cognitive nature of the material; and second, the "serious
value" test that ensures that those expressions worth protecting are in fact
protected. Concentrated attention on these two factors should be coupled
with the rigorous standard of review that the definition's separating function
requires. This test should allow triers of fact to understand more easily what
it is they are to do, enable courts to perceive more clearly their role in
reviewing determinations of obscenity and generally add predictability and
simplicity to obscenity law without decreasing the protection available to
speech under the current test. The check would be the "hard core" concept
of Miller and Jenkins, a concept that does not create an independent
standard for determining what is obscene. 13° But if Mr. Justice Stewart's
intuitive views about hard-core pornography are correct, 131 this check
should ensure that the two primary tests are properly applied.
If the contemporary community standards factor is eliminated, the
unpredictability of local standards and the concomitant problems raised in
Smith and in cases in which federal conspiracy law is applied to a definition
of the underlying crime that varies from community to community are
130. F. SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 109-13.
131. Id. at 113; see text accompanying note 72 supra.
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removed. The need to evaluate the impossible that occurred under the
national standards formulation would also disappear. Obscenity determina-
tions would be narrowed to the determination of appeal to the prurient
interest as a physiological and psychological factor and that of "serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 132 These factors are not only
more easily determinable than patent offensiveness and contemporary com-
munity standards, but they are more properly consistent with the definitional
method of dealing with obscenity. Obscenity law is difficult and confused
enough as it is without the burden of additional factors that unnecessarily
complicate the problem.
132. This is not meant to approve the particular language used by the Miller court in
expressing the general idea of value. While the concept of "social value" may in fact be too
broad and amorphous, the qualification of "serious" in the Miller formulation may be under-
protective of real speech, especially as applied by a jury.
